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hile federal copyright law has long protected creative works, 
such protection has never been absolute.  Congress did not 
design copyright law to give authors a monopoly on their works, but 
rather “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful [a]rts.”1  
In other words, Congress sought to protect intellectual property 
against misappropriation in order to encourage citizens to make and 
share their creative works with the public, thereby enriching society.  
Recognizing this public purpose, one major and long-standing 
exemption to copyright protection is “fair use,” which entitles the 
public to use and reproduce copyrighted works for limited purposes 
without liability for infringement.2 
To prepare for a century dominated by digital technology, 
Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 
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1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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1998.3  The DMCA is a comprehensive statute that contains 
provisions designed to completely update copyright law for the digital 
age, some of which have been controversial.4  One such provision is § 
1201, better known as the anti-circumvention provisions (“ACPs”).5  
Many digital works contain technological protection, often some form 
of code or encryption, which a machine must decrypt in order to 
access or copy the work.6  The ACPs impose civil, and in some cases, 
criminal liability on those who circumvent such protection or 
distribute technology that does so.7 
While § 1201 is designed to prevent illegal copying of digital 
works, it also presents a substantial obstacle to fair use.  The very 
cornerstone of fair use is that copyright holders cannot legally stop it 
from occurring.  Under § 1201, however, copyright holders can 
prevent fair use by wrapping their works in digital encryption, making 
it difficult, and sometimes impossible, for the public to exercise fair-
use rights without risking legal liability.  This Comment argues that 
the ACPs substantially limit fair use.  Because fair use is a long-
standing and important defense to copyright infringement, which 
Congress never intended to limit when it passed the DMCA, the 
ACPs should not apply to individuals making fair use of copyrighted 
works or manufacturing and distributing circumvention technology 
with intent to enable others to do so. 
Parts I and II lay out the fundamentals of conventional copyright 
law and the fair use defense to infringement.  Part III explores the 
changes in copyright law made to accommodate the digital age, 
namely the DMCA.  In the context of this statutory and common-law 
framework, Part IV explores the conflict between the ACPs and fair 
use.  Part V applies the abstract principles from Part IV via a case 
study on DVDs.  Finally, Part VI offers a proposal to solve the 
conflict introduced in Part IV: fair use should be a permissible 
affirmative defense to violations of the ACPs. 
 
3 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)). 
4 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 568–69 (4th ed. 2006). 
5 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
6 JIM TAYLOR, DVD FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (AND ANSWERS) 1.11 (2009), 
http://dvddemystified.com/dvdfaq.html#1.11. 
7 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1203. 
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I 
CONVENTIONAL COPYRIGHT 
At the broadest level, copyright originates from the intellectual 
property clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that 
“Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”8  This clause grants Congress the authority to enact 
copyright legislation and defines the fundamental purpose of 
copyright: to encourage creative minds to share their ideas with the 
public by offering them limited protection from misappropriation.  In 
other words, the Framers did not design copyright laws to benefit 
authors by granting them a monopoly on their work, but rather to 
enrich and advance society. 
Copyright law protects a broad spectrum of works.  At the most 
basic level, copyright differs from other forms of intellectual property 
in that it protects expressions of ideas, not the ideas themselves.9  The 
following types of expression are eligible for copyright protection: 
books and other literary works; musical works and accompanying 
words; dramatic works and accompanying music; pantomimes and 
choreographic works; pictorial, graphical, and sculptural works; 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and 
architectural works.10 
The critical requirement for receiving protection under any of these 
categories is that the work must be “fixed in any tangible medium.”11  
This requirement simply means that a work is not protectable unless it 
is recorded in some manner.  Most works easily satisfy this 
requirement; motion pictures, for example, are fixed once on film or 
digital media, and a story is fixed once it is written in text.  Practically 
speaking, the fixation requirement only denies copyright protection to 
works that are “purely evanescent or transient” in nature, such as an 
improvised and unrecorded speech.12 
 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).  Other forms of intellectual property, such as trade secrets 
and patents, protect ideas themselves. 
10 Id. § 102(a). 
11 Id. 
12 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52–53 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5665–66. 
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Like the spectrum of protectable works, a copyright owner has 
extensive rights, but they are not unlimited.  Most importantly, a 
copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce his or her 
work.13  In the same vein, the owner may also prevent others from 
creating new works that are too closely derived from his work.14  
Finally, copyright owners may limit distribution and public 
performance of their works.15  Currently, copyright law protects a 
work for the lifetime of its author plus seventy years, starting when 
the work is fixed in a tangible medium.16 
II 
FAIR USE AS A DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
For the registered owner of a valid copyright, a prima facie case for 
infringement has two elements: actual copying and improper 
appropriation.17  To meet the first element, the copyright owner must 
prove that the alleged infringer actually copied from the copyrighted 
work.18  This element is required because independent creation—
making a work similar to a copyrighted work, but without knowledge 
thereof—is not infringement.19  Absent direct proof of actual copying, 
a copyright owner may prove the first element circumstantially by 
demonstrating that the defendant had access to the copyrighted 
work.20  The second element, improper appropriation, focuses on how 
similar the allegedly infringing work is to the copyrighted work.21  
Courts use this information to determine whether the copying went 
“too far,” so as to constitute improper appropriation.22 
However, even if the copyright owner has proved his prima facie 
case, the defendant may claim, as an affirmative defense, that his 
 
13 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
14 Id. § 106(2). 
15 Id. § 106(4)–(6). 
16 Id. § 302(a) (2006).  Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 302(c), this period is longer for 
commercial works.  That statute provides: “In the case of . . . a work made for hire, the 
copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 
120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.” 
17 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. at 468–69. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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actions constituted fair use.23  Originally a judicial doctrine,24 fair use 
is now codified in copyright law and provides a limited exception to 
liability for otherwise infringing acts.25 
Courts examine and then weigh four primary factors when 
assessing whether an activity constitutes fair use.26  No single factor 
is determinative, nor is the list exclusive,27 as fair use is an “equitable 
rule of reason” to be applied in light of the overall purposes of the 
Copyright Act.28  Also, although the four factors are expressly 
codified, the actual meaning of each factor is subject to interpretation, 
and consequently, judicial analysis of the fair use defense notoriously 
varies from case to case.29 
Under the first factor, courts consider the “purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.”30  Here, courts primarily look to see 
whether the defendant is benefiting financially from his actions.  For 
example, making copies of a work for classroom or personal use is far 
more likely to be found “fair” than is the sale of the copies.31  Also, 
when assessing the first factor, courts sometimes consider whether the 
use is “transformative,” meaning whether it creates a work that is 
materially different from the copyrighted work.32  When they 
consider this factor, courts are more sympathetic to transformative 
than to nontransformative uses.33 
Second, courts look at the “nature of the copyrighted work.”34  
Here, the main issue is whether a work is more factual or creative.35  
Factual works are those based primarily on real information or events, 
 
23 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). 
24 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
25 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
26 Id. § 107(1)–(4). 
27 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. 
28 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976)). 
29 See, e.g., id.; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
30 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
31 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
32 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  Cf. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448–51.  In Sony, the 
Court did not analyze, nor give any weight to whether or not the use was transformative.  
See id. 
33 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
34 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
35 Harper, 471 U.S. at 563. 
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such as scientific texts and biographies, while creative works are 
fictional.  Copyright law protects the creative more than the factual, 
so a defendant accused of duplicating a factual work has a better 
chance of prevailing on a fair-use defense.36 
Third, courts look to “the amount and substantiality of the portion 
[of the copyrighted work] used in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole.”37  In other words, the greater the portion of the work 
copied, the weaker the fair-use defense.  However, a complete copy of 
a protected work is not per se infringing, as no one factor is 
determinative.38 
Finally, courts look at “the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”39  Uses that are more 
harmful to the marketability of the copyrighted work are less likely to 
be found fair.40  For example, an individual who sells an allegedly 
infringing work in the same market as the copyrighted work is less 
likely to prevail on a fair-use defense than one whose misappropriated 
work is not for sale or caters to a market segment that the copyright 
owner is unlikely to enter.41  Courts also consider whether the 
individual arguing for fair use would be likely to purchase an 
additional copy of the work if he or she could not reproduce it.42  If 
so, this factor weighs against fair use because, assuming others also 
reproduced the work, the copyright holder would lose a substantial 
volume of sales.43 
In the abstract, these factors can seem somewhat disjointed, so a 
brief survey of relevant case law and other examples is helpful to 
clarify how courts apply them.  Perhaps the clearest example of an 
activity that constitutes fair use is when a student copies part of a 
work to use in a school project.  Using a book as the hypothetical 
source work, the first factor easily weighs in favor of fair use: the 
student uses the copy entirely for nonprofit educational purposes.  
Assuming the book is a novel, the second factor weighs against fair 
 
36 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340 (1991) (denying copyright protection for names, towns, and telephone 
numbers in a telephone directory due to lack of creativity and originality). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. 
39 Id. § 107(4). 
40 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1984). 
41 See id. 
42 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 927–28 (2d Cir. 1994). 
43 See id. 
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use because creative works enjoy stronger protection than factual 
works.  The third factor, “amount and substantiality,” weighs in favor 
of fair use because an excerpt from a book is only a small part of the 
whole and is not likely to be substantial unless the book is widely 
known for only the passage chosen.  Finally, the impact on the 
commercial market for the book is likely nonexistent: if the student 
could not copy an excerpt, it is not likely that he or she would 
purchase an additional book from which to physically cut passages in 
order to avoid reproducing them.  In summary, three of the four 
factors weigh strongly in favor of fair use, so excerpting portions of a 
book for educational purposes likely is fair use. 
Not all examples of fair use are as clear.  In Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed, inter 
alia, whether using a VCR to tape television programs, primarily for 
later viewing, was fair use.44  Looking at the four factors, the Court 
first determined that the copies were for private, noncommercial use, 
which weighed in favor of fair use.45  In most cases, the nature of the 
copyrighted work was creative,46 which would ordinarily weigh in 
favor of infringement due to the stronger copyright protection 
afforded to these types of works.  However, the Court focused on the 
fact that television programs are free to the consumer, which 
neutralized the second factor.47  When assessing the amount and 
substantiality of the copied portion relative to the whole work, the 
Court acknowledged that in most cases VCR owners copied entire 
programs, which ordinarily would weigh in favor of infringement.48  
However, as with the second factor, the Court focused on the fact that 
the programs were free, which neutralized the third factor as well.49  
Finally, the Court observed that the copying had minimal impact on 
the market for television programs because (1) the programs were free 
in the first place, and (2) most taping was for nonarchival purposes 
because users typically did not save their recordings and thus had to 
purchase a copy from the producer if they wanted to watch the 
program in the distant future.50 
 
44 464 U.S. 417, 442–56 (1984). 
45 Id. at 448–49. 
46 Id. at 497 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data 
Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.C.N.J. 1977). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 450–54. 
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While Sony exemplifies a successful fair-use defense, American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.51 demonstrates the opposite.  In 
American Geophysical Union, a Texaco research facility allowed 
scientists to photocopy journals in the company library so they could 
have easy access to them to further their research.52  When the 
publisher sued for copyright infringement, Texaco claimed fair use.53  
Applying the four factors, the court first concluded that the use was 
commercial because Texaco made a profit from the researchers’ 
work, which the copies facilitated.54  Also, as the copies were 
identical to the originals, the court found them nontransformative, so 
the first factor weighed against Texaco.55  Next, the court concluded 
that the copyrighted works were generally factual, and therefore the 
second factor weighed in favor of Texaco.56  The third factor weighed 
indisputably against Texaco since the scientists copied the articles in 
their entirety.57  Finally, the court engaged in a detailed analysis of 
the fourth factor to conclude that the scientists’ activities had a 
substantial effect upon the potential market or value for the works 
and, therefore, the final factor weighed against Texaco.58  In coming 
to this conclusion, the court noted that, if Texaco were not allowed to 
make the photocopies, it would likely purchase additional 
subscriptions or obtain a photocopying license for its existing 
journals, either of which would increase revenue for the publishers.59  
Because three factors favored the publisher, the court concluded that 
the activity was not fair use.60 
To summarize, fair use is best conceptualized as an “equitable rule 
of reason,”61 that is “one of copyright law’s most important safety 
valves.”62  Courts apply fair use where a valid prima facie case for 
 
51 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
52 Id. at 914–16. 
53 Id. at 914–15. 
54 Id. at 922. 
55 Id. at 922–24. 
56 Id. at 925. 
57 Id. at 925–26. 
58 Id. at 926–32. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 931. 
61 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976)). 
62 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 
(describing fair use as “one of the most important and well established limitations on the 
exclusive right of copyright owners,” and noting “[t]he claim that a defendant’s acts 
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infringement exists, but imposing liability on the copier would stifle 
creative expression or grant too much protection to copyright 
owners.63  Fair use is an affirmative defense,64 which the defendant in 
an infringement action must plead and bears the burden of proving.65  
Finally, although codified by statute, fair use remains a complex area 
of copyright law, given that the four factors in § 107 are not an 
exhaustive list of what courts may consider and are highly subject to 
judicial interpretation.66 
III 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW 
With the advent of digital technology in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, copyrighted works advanced beyond the laws then 
protecting them.  Recall that the purpose of copyright is to benefit the 
public by forging a balance between protecting copyright owners and 
ensuring that the public gets the benefit of their works.67  For analog 
works such as books, pictures, records, videocassettes, and tapes, 
conventional copyright law achieves this balance well.  It is able to do 
so because analog works contain three intrinsic deterrents to copying 
that supplement statutory protection. 
First, there is an inevitable loss of quality associated with analog 
reproduction, such that a copy is always worse than the original.68  
While this quality loss alone is a deterrent to the would-be copier, 
even more important is that quality loss occurs with each generation 
of copies, so a copy made from a copy is even worse, and so on down 
the line.69  Consequently, a single copy cannot start a long chain of 
reproduction, since the copies quickly will become too poor in quality 
 
constituted a fair use rather than an infringement has been raised as a defense in 
innumerable copyright actions over the years, and there is ample case law recognizing the 
existence of the doctrine and applying it.”); MERGES ET AL., supra note 4, at 506 (noting 
that fair use “promot[es] cumulative creativity and free expression”). 
63 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5678; MERGES ET AL., supra note 4, at 506. 
64 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). 
65 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 451 (8th ed. 2004) (defining affirmative defense as “[a] 
defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s . . . 
claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true”). 
66 MERGES ET AL., supra note 4, at 507. 
67 See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 673, 683 (2000). 
68 TOMLINSON HOLMAN, SOUND FOR FILM AND TELEVISION 52 (2d ed. 2002). 
69 Id. 
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to be desirable.  Second, reproducing an analog work can be 
expensive since one must pay for the tangible materials needed to do 
so.  For example, analog reproduction of a photograph requires the 
purchase of costly photo paper and color ink.  Finally, copies of 
analog works can only be distributed on physical media.  This 
limitation is better explained by contrast with digital works, as 
outlined below. 
Digital works lack all three intrinsic limitations.  Generally, this 
stark contrast is due to the fact that a work stored digitally is, 
technically speaking, not the actual work itself, but rather its digital 
representation.  In other words, at the most basic level every digital 
work is composed of a series of numbers.70  A computer must 
translate and depict this representation in order for it to be 
recognizable as the copyrighted work.71 
First, unlike analog works, digital works copy perfectly.  Because 
they are stored as computer code, copying them is quite simple: a 
computer simply replicates the code, which, like the original, must be 
translated in order to depict the actual work.72  As a result, a digital 
copy is “perfect” in that it is equal in quality to the original.73  For 
example, a digital picture is a series of ones and zeroes, which, when 
interpreted by a computer, produce the image on a screen.74  To make 
a copy, the computer simply replicates this series of numbers.  An 
identical series produces a perfect copy.75  Also, unlike analog copies 
that undergo increasing quality loss with each generation, the quality 
of copied digital works never degrades,76 which results in unlimited 
generations of perfect copies. 
Second, digital reproduction is generally inexpensive.  The 
fundamental copying process is a rudimentary task for a computer, 
and there is no cost at all if the person making the copy wishes to 
retain it only on the hard drive.  Even if the copier transferred the 
 
70 Marshall Brain, How Analog and Digital Recording Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://communication.howstuffworks.com/analog-digital.htm/printable (last visited July 8, 
2009). 
71 Id. 
72 Tony Whittingham, Introduction to Digital Media, http://digitalmedia 
.sydneyinstitute.wikispaces.net/ (last visited July 8, 2009). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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work to a more portable medium, such as a recordable CD or DVD, 
these options are inexpensive as well. 
Finally, while digital works can be recorded onto tangible media, 
they can also exist entirely within computers.  This fact sets them 
starkly apart from analog works when one considers how well-
connected today’s computers are.  Thanks to computer networks and 
the Internet, digital works can travel, quite literally, at the speed of 
light.  Such speed and connectivity, combined with perfect quality 
reproduction, means that an unlimited number of perfect digital 
copies can quickly disseminate throughout the world. 
Because digital works are exempt from the built-in safeguards of 
analog media, Congress, facing a new technological era, expressed 
concern that conventional copyright law would no longer satisfy its 
constitutional purpose to serve the public good.77  Specifically, it 
recognized that infringement and piracy might become so rampant 
that creators of intellectual property would be hesitant to share their 
works with the public, thereby upsetting the delicate balance of 
copyright law.78  In this frame of mind, Congress passed the DMCA 
in 1998.79 
The DMCA has five titles, only the first of which is relevant to this 
Comment.  Known formally as the “World Intellectual Property 
Organization [“WIPO”] Copyright and Performances and 
Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998,” Title I of the 
DMCA is designed to implement two 1996 treaties to which the 
United States is a signatory: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.80  The three specific 
provisions in Title I that are relevant to this Comment go by several 
names in common parlance;81 however, this Comment refers to them 
as the Anti-Circumvention Provisions (“ACPs”). 
 
77 See Nimmer, supra note 67, at 683. 
78 Id. at 683–84. 
79 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)). 
80 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 1 (1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf 
[hereinafter DMCA SUMMARY]. 
81 TOMAS A. LIPINSKI, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE DISTANCE EDUCATION CLASSROOM  
44 (2005) (referring to the ACPs as Anti-Circumvention Rules); MERGES ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 569 (referring to the ACPs as Anticircumvention Prohibitions). 
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Unlike previous revisions to copyright law,82 the ACPs do not 
actually give greater legal protection to copyrighted works.  Instead, 
they allow copyright owners to fortify their works with digital 
security measures and impose legal penalties on persons who bypass 
such measures.83  In other words, although the ACPs are formally part 
of copyright law, they do not directly regulate the right to reproduce 
or otherwise use copyrighted works. 
To fully understand the ACPs, it is necessary to have a working 
knowledge of several technical terms.  The ACPs regulate 
“circumvention” of technological measures.84  Circumventing a 
technological measure means: descrambling a scrambled work, 
decrypting an encrypted work, or otherwise avoiding, bypassing, 
removing, deactivating, or impairing a technological security 
measure, without authorization from the copyright owner.85 
Each of the three ACPs prohibits a different activity.  First, 
pursuant to § 1201(a)(1), one may not circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work (an 
“access control”).86  An access control is a technological measure 
that, “in the ordinary course of . . . operation, requires the application 
of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the 
copyright owner, to gain access to the work.”87  For example, a 
computer program with an activation code or “CD key” that must be 
entered before the program will run is a work with an access control.  
A person who uses a rogue program, or hack, to bypass the 
authentication process has violated § 1201(a)(1). 
Second, § 1201(a)(2), proscribes “trafficking in”—that is, 
manufacturing or distributing—technology or products designed to 
circumvent access controls.88  For example, the author or distributor 
of the hack described in the previous example is in violation of § 
1201(a)(2). 
Third, § 1201(b)(1) prohibits trafficking in technology or products 
designed to circumvent a technological measure that “effectively 
 
82 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).  The 1976 revision 
extended the scope of protected materials and the term of protection. 
83 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2006). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
86 Id. § 1201(a)(1). 
87 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B). 
88 Id. § 1201(a)(2). 
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protects a right of a copyright owner”89 (a “use control”).  This 
provision differs from the previous two governing access controls in 
that, while the previous two affect technological measures that 
completely restrict access to a work, § 1201(b)(1) encompasses 
technological measures that protect specific rights of the copyright 
owner, such as copying.90  An example of a work with a use control is 
an electronic document that a licensed user may view on his screen, 
but not save or print, due to a software security feature.  A person 
who writes a program that bypasses this feature and enables copying, 
violates § 1201(b)(1) because copying is a right of the copyright 
owner.91 
To put these three subsections in perspective, § 1201(a)(1) 
proscribes circumventing access controls, and § 1201(a)(2) prohibits 
trafficking in technology that circumvents access controls.  However, 
§ 1201(b) only bans trafficking in technology that circumvents use 
controls; as far as the ACPs are concerned, an individual may freely 
circumvent use controls on his own, provided he does not distribute to 
others the technology required to do so.92 
There are several statutory exemptions to the ACPs,93 only one of 
which is relevant to the focus of this Comment.  Every three years, 
the Librarian of Congress issues a rule exempting particular classes of 
works from § 1201(a)(1) if, after research, he or she concludes that 
users of that work will be “adversely affected” by the inability to 
engage in legitimate uses due to the circumvention ban.94  Any 
exemptions so issued apply only to individual acts of circumventing 
access controls and have no bearing on trafficking, either in access or 
use-control-circumvention technology.95  Currently, there are six 
exemptions in force until the next rulemaking in 2009.96  These are 
 
89 Id. § 1201(b)(1). 
90 For a comprehensive list of rights exclusive to copyright owners, see supra text 
accompanying notes 8–10. 
91 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
92 It is important to note that there may still be an underlying claim for copyright 
infringement, even if there is no liability under the ACPs. 
93 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d), (f)–(j) (establishing additional exemptions for (1) 
nonprofits/libraries doing research to determine whether to buy legitimate copies of 
materials, (2) reverse engineering, (3) encryption research, (4) protection of minors, (5) 
personal privacy, and (6) security testing). 
94 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(E). 
95 See the statute itself, which specifies that the exceptions only apply to § 1201(a)(1). 
96 Exemption to Prohibition Against Circumvention, 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2008) (noting 
that the current exemptions are effective through Oct. 27, 2009). 
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(1) audiovisual works in a university’s library, if circumvented by 
film professors for classroom use; (2) computer programs on obsolete 
media; (3) computer programs protected by hardware locks that have 
been legitimately purchased, but are damaged; (4) electronic books 
that are only available in formats that disable “screen readers” so that 
the blind cannot access them; (5) computer programs in cellular 
phones that deny access necessary to lawfully connect to a wireless 
network; and (6) sound recordings on CD that jeopardize the security 
of one’s computer, provided the circumvention is performed to 
investigate or correct the security vulnerability.97 
Individuals who violate § 1201 can face serious penalties.  Section 
1203 provides copyright holders with a civil cause of action against 
circumventors and traffickers.98  Additionally, § 1204 provides 
criminal penalties for willful circumvention or trafficking if such acts 
result in financial gain.99 
IV 
THE CONFLICT WITH FAIR USE 
As written, the ACPs purport to steer clear of fair use.  They 
expressly proclaim: “[n]othing in [§ 1201] . . . shall affect . . . 
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use.”100  Also, the 
fact that the ACPs do not restrict circumvention of use controls 
theoretically caters to fair use by allowing individuals who wish to 
engage in fair use to bypass such controls without risking liability.101  
Finally, Congress designed the triennial exemption process through 
the Librarian of Congress as a safety net in case § 1201(a)(1), as 
applied, unduly limits fair use for a given class of works.102 
However, despite these three precautions, the ACPs substantially 
limit fair use in two major ways.  The first pertains solely to the § 
1201(a)(1) prohibition on individual acts of circumventing access 
controls.  Conceptually, it is simple: an individual who wishes to 
make fair use of a work protected by an access control must access 
that work, which in turn, requires circumventing the access control, 
violating § 1201(a)(1).  Since the individual cannot access the work 
 
97 Id. 
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a). 
99 Id. § 1204. 
100 Id. § 1201(c). 
101 DMCA SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 4. 
102 Id. at 5. 
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without violating § 1201(a)(1), he cannot engage in fair use without 
exposing himself to liability. 
The second way that the ACPs restrict fair use involves § 
1201(b)(1), the anti-trafficking provision for use controls.  As noted 
in Part II, supra, fair use typically involves making a partial or 
complete copy of a copyrighted work.  One way in which a use 
control can protect a work is by preventing copying.103  Theoretically, 
an individual may circumvent this use control in order to make fair 
use of a copyrighted work, because § 1201(b)(1) only bans the act of 
circumvention with regard to access controls.  However, in most 
cases, the individual will be unable to do so unless he was either well-
versed in computer programming or if another person has violated § 
1201(b)(1) on his behalf. 
The reason for this de facto limit on fair use is that few individuals 
have the skills necessary to circumvent use controls on their own.  In 
most cases, use controls consist of complex software encryption, 
which only experienced programmers can decrypt.104  For the average 
individual, the only realistic option is to obtain circumvention 
software from a third party, thereby subjecting that party to liability 
for trafficking pursuant to § 1201(b)(1). 
This de facto limit also applies to § 1201(a)(2), the ban on 
trafficking in access control circumvention technology, but only when 
the Librarian of Congress has exempted the class of work being 
circumvented from § 1201(a)(1) liability.  For example, if an 
individual with software stored on obsolete, unplayable media 
ordered a device on the Internet to allow him to transfer that software 
to newer media, the individual would be exempt from liability for the 
circumvention itself, but the online merchant could face liability 
under § 1201(a)(2) for trafficking in access control circumvention 
technology because the exemptions do not cover traffickers.105 
Thus, while the ACPs theoretically have special allowances built in 
to protect fair use, as applied, they actually restrict it quite 
substantially.  Examining the tension between the ACPs and fair use 
through a case study on DVDs provides further support for this 
conclusion and demonstrates that the conflict is not just theoretical. 
 
103 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(2), (4)–(6) (defining the rights of copyright holders). 
104 MERGES ET AL., supra note 4, at 570. 
105 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(E). 
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V 
CASE STUDY: DVDS 
Since the mid-1990s, the motion picture industry has been 
releasing films digitally in DVD format.106  Formally known as 
“Digital Versatile Discs,”107 DVDs have become the most common 
storage media for commercial films due to their superior image 
quality and the functionality of previous formats, such as VHS and 
Betamax.108  As digital media containing valuable intellectual 
property, DVDs have also taken full advantage of the ACPs by 
employing complex technological measures to safeguard their 
contents from unauthorized access and duplication.109  However, 
while these security measures undoubtedly deter piracy, they also 
provide an excellent example of how the ACPs allow DVD 
manufacturers to substantially limit, and in some cases eliminate, fair 
use. 
Preliminarily, it is important to note that because DVDs are simply 
media for storing motion pictures, copyright does not protect the 
actual discs, just the motion pictures on them.  Consequently, for 
purposes of fair use analysis, a motion picture on DVD is identical to 
one stored on any other media, and there are numerous fair-use 
activities that individuals may engage in with respect to motion 
pictures. 
For example, it is likely fair use for an individual to copy an 
excerpt of a film, whether purchased or borrowed, for use in an 
academic project or lecture.  First, the purpose and character of such 
use, if for education, is noncommercial.  The fact that the copy is 
nontransformative is of little significance given that the use is 
overwhelmingly noncommercial, and the U.S. Supreme Court gave 
no consideration to the transformative question in Sony, which also 
involved copying video.110  Thus, the first factor (purpose and 
character) leans toward a finding of fair use.  Second, assuming that 
the film is fictional, it enjoys a higher degree of copyright protection 
than a factual work, which pushes this factor against fair use.  Third, 
 
106 MICROSOFT CORP., MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, DIGITAL 
VERSATILE DISC (DVD) (2008), http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761582825/DVD 
.html. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 1.11. 
110 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–51 (1984). 
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the amount and substantiality of the portion used is only a small 
excerpt of the work, which weighs in favor of fair use.  Finally, the 
effect of the use on the market for/value of the film is nonexistent.  
There is no reason that a clip from a film, used for academia or 
comment, would compete with legitimate sales of the film.  Also, a 
student or teacher would be unlikely to buy a copy of the film if 
denied permission to make the clips because the use is so limited, and 
purchasing the whole film would be extravagant.  Thus, the fourth 
factor weighs in favor of fair use.  Since three out of the four factors 
weigh in favor of fair use, copying film clips for academic purposes is 
likely fair use.  Further evidence to support this conclusion is the 
current Librarian of Congress exemption to § 1201(a)(1) that allows 
film and media studies professors to copy DVDs in a university’s 
library in order to make compilations of clips for instruction.111  The 
commentary to this exemption explicitly notes that the rationale for 
allowing the exemption was that making compilations of clips of 
commercial films for instructional purposes is a noninfringing use.112 
A second activity involving DVDs that is likely fair use is making 
complete copies of legitimately purchased films for backup (in case of 
damage to the original) or media-shifting purposes (i.e., copying the 
film onto a laptop or other portable media player so as to avoid 
bringing along one’s bulky and expensive DVD collection when 
traveling).  Under the first factor, the character and purpose of this use 
is entirely personal and therefore noncommercial, so it weighs in 
favor of fair use.  For the same reason as the previous example, the 
nontransformative nature of the copies is of no importance.  The 
second factor weighs against fair use, assuming the motion pictures 
copied are fictional.  Third, the amount and substantiality of the work 
used is the entire film, which ordinarily weighs against fair use.  
However, there is precedent for this type of activity that suggests 
otherwise: in Sony the VCR users taped entire programs, but the 
Court gave less weight to this fact because the works taped were free 
to the public in the first place.  Here, the motion picture being copied 
is not “free,” but the individual making the copy has already 
purchased it, giving him the same right to use it as if it were broadcast 
on television: he may freely watch it.  Thus, here, as in Sony, the third 
factor shifts toward neutrality.  Finally, the effect on the market/value 
 
111 Exemption to Prohibition Against Circumvention, 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2008). 
112 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,473–74 (Nov. 27, 2006) (codified 
at 37 C.F.R. 201.40). 
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of the original work is nominal when an individual makes a backup or 
media-shifting copy of a motion picture.  If denied the opportunity to 
back up his movie collection, an individual is not likely to purchase a 
second copy of the work; the entire purpose of making a backup is to 
protect his original investment so as to avoid having to purchase a 
second copy of the DVD.  And while it is possible that an individual 
denied the right to transfer his films onto a laptop would purchase 
them again in digital file format, it makes for more economic sense, 
albeit inconvenient, for that individual to simply bring his DVD 
collection with him when traveling.  Thus, factors one and four weigh 
strongly in favor of fair use, factor two weighs against it, and factor 
three is neutral.  Therefore, the overall balance suggests that archiving 
or media shifting a purchased video collection is fair use. 
Although the above activities likely constitute fair use, the ACPs 
effectively criminalize or create civil liability for each of them.  
Commercial DVDs contain at least one, and often several forms of 
encryption designed to prevent unauthorized copying.113  The most 
common of these schemes is the Content Scramble System (“CSS”), 
which, for purposes of the ACPs, operates as both an access control 
and a use control.114  On a DVD with CSS, the data representing the 
film is encrypted using an algorithm.115  CSS is an access control 
because in order to play the disc the user must have a DVD player 
with properly licensed CSS circuitry, which, today is standard on all 
DVD equipment, or DVD software with a license to decrypt CSS.116  
If not decrypted, the movie would appear scrambled and 
unintelligible117 or would not play at all.118  CSS is also a use control 
because one cannot copy an encrypted DVD without accessing its 
contents, which requires circumventing CSS.119 
Since CSS is both an access and a use control, it is necessary to 
analyze the fair use conflict from both perspectives.  First, from the 
access control perspective, § 1201(a)(1) bans individual acts of 
 
113 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 1.11. 
114 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1095–97 
(N.D. Cal. 2004). 
115 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 1.11. 
116 Id. 
117 This phenomenon is observable by playing CSS protected video file directly from its 
source without decrypting it. 
118 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 437 (2d. Cir. 2001). 
119 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.  Although it is technically possible to make a 
copy of a disc without circumventing CSS, that copy would be completely unplayable.  Id. 
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circumventing CSS.  However, in order to copy all or part of a DVD 
for academic, archival, or media-shifting purposes, one must access 
the information on it, which necessitates circumventing CSS.  It may 
be argued that under this logic one must also violate § 1201(a)(1) in 
order to watch a DVD.  However, decrypting CSS with a licensed 
DVD player is not circumvention because, pursuant to the license, the 
copyright owner has specifically authorized such decryption.120  
However, decrypting CSS by any other means, such as with a 
computer program in order to copy the DVD for a fair-use purpose, is 
prohibited circumvention because there is no such license. 
Next, from the use-control perspective, it is not illegal for an 
individual to circumvent CSS because § 1201(b) does not prohibit 
individual acts of circumventing use controls.121  However, 
circumventing CSS on one’s own requires extensive technological 
and programming skills.122  For the vast majority of people, the only 
practical way to do so is to obtain software written by a third party 
that can break the encryption.  The problem with this solution is that 
the ACPs ban trafficking in such software because it circumvents a 
use control.123  Essentially, then, the only way to obtain such a 
program is for someone else to violate § 1201(b)(2) by writing or 
distributing it.124 
While the statutory conflict between the ACPs and fair use of 
DVDs is clear, courts have done little to resolve it to date.  Several 
courts have addressed the issue of circumventing CSS and, in all 
instances, have found traffickers of circumvention technology liable 
for violating the ACPs.  These courts refused to give much 
consideration to the fair-use arguments presented by the defendants. 
 
120 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (proscribing only trafficking in circumvention technology 
for use controls, not the act of circumventing use controls). 
122 See Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 437–39 (describing the complicated 
procedure Jon Johansen employed to reverse engineer a DVD player and then write a 
program to decrypt CSS). 
123 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (proscribing trafficking in circumvention of use controls). 
124 This dilemma also applies to film and media professors who wish to exercise the 
Librarian of Congress exemption to § 1201(a)(1), which allows them to circumvent access 
controls on DVDs in their institution’s library.  However, even though these professors are 
exempt from the § 1201(a)(1) ban on individual acts of circumvention, unless they are also 
computer-science professors, the only way they can circumvent the CSS is to obtain 
software programmed to do so for them.  However, under § 1201(a)(2), trafficking in 
circumvention technology for access controls is not allowed, so, once again a third party 
must violate the ACPs in order for fair use to be possible. 
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For example, in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the Second 
Circuit considered whether several individuals could post an 
algorithm for decrypting CSS on their website for others to download 
and use.125  Among other arguments, the defendants claimed that the 
ACPs “eliminate[d] fair use” with respect to DVDs.126  However, the 
court strictly followed the ACP statutory language, affirming the 
district court’s finding that the defendants had violated the ACP 
trafficking bans.127  In addressing the defendants’ fair-use argument, 
the court noted that an injunction does not prohibit fair use, but rather 
bans “trafficking in a decryption code that enables unauthorized 
access to copyrighted materials.”128  To support its ruling, the court 
noted that there were other methods to make fair use of protected 
DVDs without circumventing CSS.  Specifically, the court suggested 
that individuals “point[] a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a 
monitor as it displays the DVD movie.”129  In response to the 
argument that such a copy would be inferior to the original, both in 
quality and manipulability, the court replied “[f]air use has never been 
. . . a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it 
by the fair user’s preferred technique or in the format of the 
original.”130 
Similarly, in 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., a 
federal district court addressed whether 321 Studios, the manufacturer 
of “DVD X-Copy,” a program designed to allow users to make 
backup copies of their DVD collection, had violated the ACPs.131  
The court treated CSS as both a use and an access control132 and 
found 321 Studios to be in violation of both trafficking provisions.133  
With regard to the fair use question, the court echoed the Corley court 
regarding alternate methods of fair use and then went one step further, 
noting that “the downstream uses of [DVD X-Copy] by . . . customers 
. . . , whether legal or illegal, are not relevant to determining whether 
321 [Studios] is violating” the ACPs.134  With this statement, the 
 
125 273 F.3d at 429. 
126 Id. at 458. 
127 Id. at 459–60. 
128 Id. at 459. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
132 Id. at 1095. 
133 Id. at 1104–05. 
134 Id. at 1097. 
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court effectively separated the ACPs from fair use, holding the latter 
to be irrelevant to a determination of whether or not to hold a 
trafficker liable. 
Notwithstanding the holdings in these two cases, a strict 
application of the ACPs to CSS-protected DVDs does substantially 
restrict fair use.  Both the 321 Studios and Corley courts found that 
the ACPs do not impermissibly limit fair use.  They pointed to the 
fact that it is still technically possible to make an analog copy of a 
CSS protected work without circumventing CSS, thereby preserving 
the right to fair use.135  While technically it is possible to make such a 
copy, the courts give only passing mention to the real problems with 
doing so: poor quality of the copy produced, and the impracticality in 
producing it. 
In Corley, the court suggested that a user wishing to make fair use 
of a protected DVD point a camcorder at his monitor as it displays the 
film.  The court noted that the copy produced would not be of the 
same quality as the original, but that fair use is satisfied because it is a 
copy nonetheless.  However, to say that a copy of a DVD created by 
pointing a camera at a monitor is “not as perfect or manipulable”136 
as the original is a drastic understatement.  As discussed in Part III, 
supra, analog reproduction inherently involves loss of quality, even 
when performed with precision-duplication systems.  For example, 
copying a VHS tape by playing it in one VCR and then recording the 
analog feed with another will result in a tape of decreased, but still 
useable, quality.137  What the court suggests here is far inferior to 
even this imperfect system.  A video camera pointed at a monitor will 
produce a copy that is of drastically lower quality than the original 
due to factors such as background noise, low lighting, low resolution, 
and, if the monitor used is of the conventional cathode-ray-tube 
variety, screen flicker.138  Due to their poor quality, such copies are 
 
135 Id. at 1101–02; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d. Cir. 
2001). 
136 Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 459. 
137 JOHN W.C. VAN BOGART, MAGNETIC TAPE STORAGE AND HANDLING: A GUIDE 
FOR LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES 2.4 (1995), http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub54/ 
2what_wrong.html (“When an analog tape is copied, the original information signal is 
actually copied along with any tape noise inherent in the tape and any electronic noise 
inherent in the recording device.  This will be written to a new tape that also has its own 
level of inherent tape noise.”). 
138 Reasons for these quality reductions include the fact that there is open air space 
between the camera and the monitor, there may be dirt on the monitor or on the lens, there 
may be lighting issues or issues with getting the volume right, and, in the case of 
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likely to be useless for the fair use activities previously described.  
For example, a non-media studies professor who wished to copy a 
series of clips for a presentation in a large lecture hall, could not 
effectively do so if the resulting picture had poor resolution and sound 
quality.  Also, a poor quality archival copy of a DVD would not serve 
its fundamental purpose: to back up the original.139 
More importantly, even if a copy produced by the aforementioned 
method were of suitable quality for the fair uses outlined above, 
making it simply would be too difficult to be practical.  Whereas 
digital reproduction requires only the click of a mouse,140 producing a 
copy by pointing a camera at the screen is much more complicated.  
To do so, one must first purchase an expensive video camera.  Also, 
one must be skilled about how to calibrate for the proper lighting, 
including the brightness of the screen and any ambient light in the 
room.  Additionally, one must position the speakers and adjust the 
volume so as to produce clear sound that does not overload the video 
camera’s microphone.  Finally, one must have substantial time to 
devote to the activity, as the “point and shoot” reproduction method 
can only be performed in real time, and will require extensive time to 
set up and calibrate.  This time period may be doubled, or even tripled 
for the user who wishes to transfer the resulting copy onto his 
computer for travel purposes or onto a DVD to watch on his home 
television, because either task entails some form of encoding.141  
Finally, if the screen used is a conventional, cathode-ray-tube monitor 
 
conventional monitors, the picture may be riddles with flickers.  The sound quality is also 
likely to be reduced given the open air space between the speakers and the microphone. 
139 Further proof that such a copy is of too poor of quality to be useful comes from the 
fact that the Librarian of Congress felt compelled to issue a special exemption to § 
1201(a)(1) for media-studies professors.  The legislative commentary to the exemption 
notes that it was granted because the DVD films are of “higher quality” than copies 
available in other formats.  See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright 
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,474 (Nov. 
27, 2006) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40).  If a commercially available other format is of 
too poor of quality for classroom instruction, then a copy produced by the point and shoot 
method advanced by the Corley court, which is substantially worse than other commercial 
formats, is too poor for any useful purpose. 
140 See, e.g., DVDFab.com, http://www.dvdfab.com/fab-compare.htm (last visited July 
8, 2009) (purporting to “copy all movies, menus and trailers to a DVD with just one 
click”). 
141 Transcoding video from one format to another can take hours to complete, 
depending on the computer used to do so. 
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or television,142 making the copy in the manner the court suggested 
may be impossible due to screen flicker.143 
Although the court did not suggest it, Corley supporters may argue 
that there is a better method for reproducing DVDs without 
circumventing CSS: connecting the analog cable from one’s DVD 
player to a VCR or computer capture card and then recording the feed 
onto a VHS tape or another DVD.  However, while these methods 
would, in some cases, produce a better copy than the point-and-shoot 
method from Corley, they still suffer serious limitations in quality and 
practicality.  As a result, they are an insufficient solution to the 
conflict between the ACPs and fair use with respect to DVDs for 
several reasons. 
First, recording the analog feed from a DVD player with a VCR is 
nearly impossible144 because DVD players deliberately add a 
scrambling signal, known as Macrovision, to the outgoing video feed, 
which adds distortion to VCR-made copies.145  Recording the analog 
feed with a video capture card on a computer, to then copy onto a 
recordable DVD, is a different story.  Some capture cards, including 
those made by at least one prominent graphics-card manufacturer, do 
not record signals containing Macrovision.146  Other cards are not 
susceptible to the Macrovision signal, which makes them able to 
record the analog feed.147 
However, this method still is not a remedy to ACP/fair-use conflict 
because there are so many practical difficulties that fair-use copying 
of DVDs remains out of reach unless one is quite tech-savvy and has 
 
142 A cathode-ray-tube display, or CRT, is a non-flat panel monitor, which produces the 
screen image with a cathode ray tube.  Marshall Brain, How Television Works: The 
Cathode Ray Tube, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/tv3.htm 
(last visited July 8, 2009). 
143 What Is All the Flickering When I Try to Record a Television Set Picture with a 
Video Camera?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/ 
question336.htm (last visited July 8, 2009). 
144 Theoretically, one can purchase hardware products that, when placed in-line, can 
remove macrovision from a video signal, but these are expensive, add another complicated 
step to the copying process, and may infringe on the Macrovision patent.  See, e.g., 
Clearpix Media, Digital Video Stabilizer, http://www.checkhere22.com/stabilizer/ (last 
visited July 8, 2009); see also Antti Paarlahti, Macrovision FAQ, http://www.repairfaq 
.org/filipg/LINK/F_MacroVision1.html#MACROVISION_004 (last visited July 8, 2009). 
145 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 1.11. 
146 Jeff Mathurin, ATI All-in-Wonder Cards and Macrovision, BILINE.CA, 
http://www.biline.ca/ati_macrovision.htm (last visited July 8, 2009). 
147 Macrovision and How to Defeat It, http://www.infocellar.com/DVD/index.htm (last 
visited July 8, 2009). 
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substantial time to devote to the activity.  Specifically, to copy a film 
by the analog capture method, an individual must (1) research and 
purchase a video capture card that is not susceptible to Macrovision; 
(2) install that card into the computer, which may require 
disassembling and reassembling hardware; (3) connect the DVD 
player to the capture card using the proper cable; (4) calibrate the 
video and audio capture settings to produce a video file of sufficient 
quality; (5) capture the video from the DVD player in real time; (6) 
encode the video into proper DVD format; and (7) record the encoded 
file onto a DVD.  Ultimately, due to the technological skills, labor, 
and time required to reproduce a DVD in this manner, doing so is 
simply too impractical when one can accomplish the task digitally in 
minutes and with relative ease.  Also, it produces a copy that is 
inferior to the original, both because there is inherent quality loss due 
to the analog feed, and because the manipulability features, such as 
chapters and menus, will not be part of the copy.148 
Finally, the DVD industry likely would argue that the conflict 
between the ACPs and fair use has recently been solved with respect 
to DVDs by a new feature known as “Digital Copy.”  Introduced in 
2008,149 the basic premise of this feature is to allow those who 
purchase a DVD to transfer a digital movie file (“DMF”) of the film 
to their computer or compatible portable media device.150 
A DVD equipped with Digital Copy comes with an additional disc 
and a unique identification number.151  After purchasing, the 
customer loads the additional disc into his or her computer and enters 
the identification number.152  This code is authenticated over the 
Internet with the DVD manufacturer who then issues a license that 
allows the DMF to be transferred from the disc to the computer, and if 
desired, to a compatible portable media device.153  The transferred 
 
148 These features are embedded into the digital code. 
149 Mike Musgrove, “Digital Copy”: New DVDs and Blu-Ray Discs Bundled With 
iPod-Friendly Files, WASH. POST: POST I.T., Apr. 18, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost 
.com/posttech/2008/04/digital_copy_new_dvds_and_blur.html. 
150 Id. 
151 Twentieth Century Fox, Digital Copy: How it Works, http://www.foxdigitalcopy 
.com/ (last visited July 8, 2009). 
152 Id. 
153 Lionsgate Entertainment, Digital Copy for Windows Media, http://www 
.lionsgatedigitalcopy.com/support/howwm.html (last visited July 8, 2009); Lionsgate 
Entertainment, Digital Copy for iTunes, http://www.lionsgatedigitalcopy.com/support/ 
howitunes.html (last visited July 8, 2009). 
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DMF is an encrypted file that will play only on a device with the 
downloaded license.154 
Proponents of Digital Copy may argue that it addresses the fair use 
concerns of DVD consumers, especially with respect to media 
shifting, because it provides a quick, easy, and legal means for 
transferring movies to computers and portable devices.155  However, 
while Digital Copy does aid in some media shifting, it is rife with 
limitations that make it inadequate even for this stated purpose.  Also 
Digital Copy does nothing to enable consumers to exercise their fair-
use right to make backup copies of their DVDs, or to copy excerpts 
for educational purposes. 
Several limitations of Digital Copy hinder its stated purpose of 
facilitating media shifting.  First, DMFs are not compatible with all 
platforms or portable media players: they can only be played on the 
Windows and Macintosh operating systems, using Windows Media 
Player or iTunes.156  Consumers who use other operating systems or 
software must make the switch in order to enjoy the benefits of 
Digital Copy.  As for portable media players, DMFs will only play on 
certified “PlaysForSure” Windows Media compatible devices,157 and 
in some cases, iPods and iPhones.158  Neither limitation exists for 
media shifting performed by decrypting CSS.  With proper software, 
 
154 Twentieth Century Fox, Digital Copy: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.foxdigitalcopy.com/ (last visited July 8, 2009) (stating that Fox Digital Copy 
uses digital rights management). 
155 Lionsgate Entertainment, What Is a Digital Copy?, http://www.lionsgatedigitalcopy 
.com/support/ (last visited July 8, 2009) (stating that a digital copy can be “quickly and 
legally transferred from . . . [a] DVD to . . . [a] computer and compatible portable 
device”). 
156 Twentieth Century Fox, Digital Copy: Support: Application Support, 
http://www.foxdigitalcopy.com/ (last visited July 8, 2009); Lionsgate Entertainment, 
Digital Copy Support, http://www.lionsgatedigitalcopy.com/support/support.html (last 
visited July 8, 2009); Disney.com, DisneyFile Digital Copy: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://disney.go.com/disneyvideos/disneyfile/textonly.html (last visited July 8, 2009). 
157 Twentieth Century Fox, Digital Copy: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.foxdigitalcopy.com/ (last visited July 8, 2009) (stating that Fox Digital Copy 
files are compatible with PlaysForSure devices, but not with iPods, PSP players, or other 
portable devices). 
158 Lionsgate Entertainment, Digital Copy Support, http://www.lionsgatedigitalcopy 
.com/support/support.html (last visited July 8, 2009) (stating compatibility with iPod and 
iPhone). 
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a DVD movie can be converted to any desired file type for use on any 
operating system or portable device.159 
Next, DMFs have extremely limited transferability.  If a user elects 
to transfer the Windows Media Player version of the DMF, it can only 
be played on one computer and one portable device.160  The digital 
license issued when a DMF is first transferred to a computer is tied to 
that machine and the first portable device used, which prevents the 
DMF from functioning on any others.161  If a consumer elects to use 
the iTunes version of the DMF, the license is tied to that person’s 
iTunes account and will only play on up to five computers at a 
time.162  Especially for Windows Media Player users, this 
transferability limitation presents a very real problem given that many 
people own and/or use multiple computers and devices. 
Related to transferability, Digital Copy is of little to no value to 
second-hand buyers.  The unique identification number sold with each 
Digital-Copy-enabled DVD is only good for one nontransferrable 
license,163 so unless the first buyer never copied the DMF, the 
second-hand buyer would have no access it.  Even if the first buyer 
never transferred the DMF, the second-hand buyer might lose out 
because unique identification numbers on some DVDs expire one 
year after the initial release of the DVD.164  These two limitations can 
also affect first-time buyers if they purchase a new DVD that has been 
in stores for more than a year or need to transfer a second copy of the 
DMF in the event of hard drive failure or other data loss. 
Finally, perhaps the biggest limitation of Digital Copy with respect 
to media shifting is that it is not included with every new release, and 
it has no application to previously released DVDs.  For new releases 
lacking Digital Copy, the problem is obvious: one cannot use a 
missing feature.  As for movies that predate Digital Copy, although 
 
159 See, e.g., DVDFab.com, http://www.dvdfab.com/fab-compare.htm (last visited July 
8, 2009).  DVDFab allows the user to convert a DVD movie into various formats, 
compatible with various portable devices, all with no encryption. 
160 Twentieth Century Fox, Digital Copy: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.foxdigitalcopy.com/ (last visited July 8, 2009). 
161 Disney.com, Digital Copy: Frequently Asked Questions, http://disney.go.com/ 
disneyvideos/disneyfile/textonly.html (last visited July 8, 2009). 
162 See Cory Bohon, iTunes 101: Deauthorize All Computers at Once (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://www.tuaw.com/2008/11/12/itunes-101-deauthorize-all-computers-at-once/. 
163 Lionsgate Entertainment, Digital Copy Support, http://www.lionsgatedigitalcopy 
.com/support/support.html (last visited July 8, 2009). 
164 Disney.com, Digital Copy: Frequently Asked Questions, http://disney.go.com/ 
disneyvideos/disneyfile/textonly.html (last visited July 8, 2009). 
 2008] Circumventing Fair Use 1319 
DVD manufacturers are re-releasing many older films with the new 
feature,165 it does not benefit customers who already have extensive 
DVD libraries.  These customers would have to repurchase all the 
DVDs they already own in order to be able to exercise a fair-use right 
that they have already paid for. 
Beyond the limitations that prevent Digital Copy from achieving its 
stated purpose of enabling media shifting, it is also an inadequate 
solution to the overall conflict between the ACPs and fair use because 
it does nothing to enable consumers to make backup copies of their 
DVDs or to create excerpts for educational purposes.  As already 
established, a DMF is an encrypted file that can only be played in 
Windows Media Player and iTunes.  The consequence of this 
restriction is that other video editing and DVD authoring programs 
cannot decrypt the file in order to create short clips or convert it to 
DVD format (the latter is required in order to burn it to a DVD-player 
compatible disc).166  Furthermore, even if a DMF could be decrypted, 
burning it to a DVD would yield a copy with many of the same 
limitations as the analog-capture method described above: the menus 
and special features of the DVD would be lost, and the video would 
not be as high quality as the original.167 
The bottom line is that the only truly effective way to reproduce 
DVD movies for fair-use purposes is by circumventing CSS.  
However, both the ACPs and courts interpreting them proscribe such 
fair use by imposing liability on those who circumvent and distribute 
software that can circumvent CSS. 
VI 
MOVING TOWARD A SOLUTION 
Although the ACPs interfere with fair use, there is a less-drastic 
solution than simply striking them down.  Indeed, a complete repeal 
 
165 Twentieth Century Fox, Digital Copy: Available Movies, http://www.foxdigitalcopy 
.com/ (last visited July 8, 2009). 
166 In order to burn a video file to a DVD, that file must first be converted to an 
appropriate MPEG-2 DVD format, or it will not play in standard players.  Commercial 
conversion programs such as AVS Video Converter are unable to convert an encrypted 
file, making DVD authoring impossible. 
167 Twentieth Century Fox, Digital Copy: Support: Minimum System Requirements, 
http://www.foxdigitalcopy.com/ (last visited July 8, 2009) (noting that Digital Copy video 
files are encoded as MPEG-4 or Windows Media enhanced files).  Both file formats are 
compressed, and therefore reduced quality video files.  Also, video files playable in iTunes 
and Windows Media Player do not contain menus and lack access to special features 
contained on DVDs. 
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would be overly harsh, given that Congress had a legitimate concern 
over digital piracy when it enacted the ACPs.  However, Congress 
never intended for them to cripple the public’s ability to make fair use 
of copyrighted works.  The best evidence of this intent comes from 
the statute itself: “[n]othing in [section 1201] shall affect . . . defenses 
to copyright infringement, including fair use.”168  Also, as noted in 
Part IV, supra, the purpose of exempting use controls from 
circumventor liability was to protect fair use.  However, as the 
previous two sections demonstrate, Congress did not achieve the 
balance it had hoped for because the ACPs substantially restrict fair 
use. 
Instead of repealing the ACPs, courts hearing DMCA cases should 
employ the following proposal: allow fair use as an affirmative 
defense to violations of §§ 1201(a)–(b).  In other words, those who 
circumvent access controls should be exempt from liability if they did 
so to engage in fair use of copyrighted materials.  Similarly, those 
who traffic in technology designed to circumvent access or use 
controls should not be liable for violating the ACPs if they can prove 
that they solely intended for their circumvention technology to enable 
fair use, even if it were also capable enabling infringing use. 
Courts should adopt this proposal because it would strike a better 
balance between protecting fair use and curbing digital piracy.  As 
demonstrated in the preceding sections of this Comment, the ACPs 
substantially limit fair use despite clear congressional intent to avoid 
doing so.  Adopting the proposal would correct this problem by 
implementing a “fair use safety valve” to the ACPs, so that copyright 
owners could not hold liable those who circumvent to engage in fair 
use, or those who traffic in circumvention technology solely to 
facilitate fair use.  In this way, the proposal would link the ACPs 
more closely to conventional copyright law, ensuring that the ACPs 
could only be used to impose liability when there was an underlying 
copyright violation.  At the same time, the proposal would ensure that 
the ACPs continue to serve their stated purpose of curbing digital 
copyright infringement because those who circumvent in order to 
infringe, or traffic with intent other than to facilitate fair use, may still 
be held liable. 
Applying the proposal to the DVD case study outlined in Part V, 
supra, an individual seeking to backup his purchased film collection 
could use third-party software to circumvent CSS and avoid § 
 
168 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2006). 
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1201(a)(1) liability by asserting fair use.  Also, if the author of CSS-
decrypting software intended solely for consumers to create fair use 
backup copies with it were sued, he could claim fair use as an 
affirmative defense if charged with a § 1201(a)(2) or § 1201(b)(1) 
trafficking violation.  However, if the individual circumvented CSS to 
copy a DVD rented from a local video store, he would still be liable 
for the § 1201(a)(1) violation, just as he would be liable for copyright 
infringement, since this activity is not fair use.  Similarly, if the 
author of CSS-decrypting software intended to facilitate infringement, 
he would be liable for violating both § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1), 
and possibly for contributory copyright infringement. 
While no court has adopted the proposal as written, there is judicial 
support for the underlying idea of linking circumvention liability to 
actual copyright infringement.  In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink 
Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered whether a garage-
door manufacturer that marketed a universal door opener was liable 
for a § 1201(a)(2) trafficking violation because the opener 
circumvented an access control on the embedded software in 
plaintiff’s garage door system.169  The court concluded that, although 
the defendant sold a device that circumvented an access control, it 
was not liable because there was no violation of underlying copyright 
law.170  Specifically, the court noted that those who used the 
defendant’s universal opener had rightfully purchased plaintiff’s 
garage door system, and copyright law did not bar them from using it 
as they saw fit.171  The court then laid out the following standard for § 
1201(a)(2) claims: 
A plaintiff alleging a violation of § 1201(a)(2) must prove: (1) 
ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled 
by a technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that 
third parties can now access (4) without authorization, in a manner 
that (5) infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by the 
Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the defendant either (i) 
designed or produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made 
available despite only limited commercial significance other than 
circumvention; or (iii) marketed for use in circumvention of the 
controlling technological measure.  A plaintiff incapable of 
establishing any one of elements (1) through (5) will have failed to 
prove a prima facie case.172 
 
169 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
170 Id. at 1204. 
171 Id. at 1202. 
172 Id. at 1203. 
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Since this list is comprised of elements, a plaintiff must prove all of 
them in order to escape liability.  In Chamberlain, the plaintiff was 
unable to prove element four because the universal opener users had 
authorization to use their purchased garage door system.173  The 
plaintiff also failed to meet element five because the circumvention 
only enabled use of the software in the garage door system, which in 
no way infringed upon the manufacturer’s copyright.174 
The Chamberlain rule generally supports the proposal outlined 
above because, unlike Corley and 321 Studios, it ties circumvention to 
conventional copyright law, requiring that there be a valid claim for 
copyright infringement before imposing liability for circumvention.  
Also, while the Chamberlain court did not face an issue involving fair 
use, it suggested that fair use could be a valid defense for someone 
accused of circumvention: “[w]e leave open the question as to when § 
107 [fair use] might serve as an affirmative defense to a prima facie 
violation of § 1201.”175 
Taking the court’s cue, the proposal provides an answer to this 
open question by extending the Chamberlain principles to fair use.  In 
addition, the proposal goes one step further than Chamberlain by 
narrowing the intent standard for traffickers.  Unlike Chamberlain, 
which strictly follows the ACP language imposing liability on 
traffickers that produce products designed for circumvention, the 
proposal grants an exemption from liability for such traffickers, as 
long as they intend for their products to circumvent solely for fair-use 
purposes.  In the context of fair use, this change is justified because, 
in many cases, making fair use of a work with technological 
protection requires circumvention.  As a result, proof that a trafficker 
distributed circumvention technology with intent to facilitate 
circumvention does not also prove that the trafficker intended to 
facilitate infringement; he could have intended solely to facilitate fair 
use.  The proposal’s intent standard would prevent such well-
intentioned traffickers from being treated the same as those who seek 
to promote infringement. 
Perhaps the most significant counterargument to the proposal is 
that it would take the wind out of the sails of the ACPs and result in 
rampant digital piracy.  This argument is unfounded because allowing 
fair use as a defense to circumvention and trafficking claims in no 
 
173 Id. at 1204. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 1199 n.14. 
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way hinders enforcement of the ACPs.  If an individual circumvented 
an access control to engage in an infringing activity, he still could be 
held liable for both the ACP violation and copyright infringement.  
Similarly, if a trafficker distributed circumvention technology for any 
purpose other than facilitating fair use, he could be held liable for 
both an ACP violation and possibly for contributory infringement, 
which is explained in detail, later.  Requiring a valid copyright 
infringement claim before imposing liability under the ACPs simply 
ensures that the ACPs do only what they were intended to do: prevent 
copyright infringement without restricting legitimate uses of 
copyrighted material. 
In the same vein, a second counterargument to the proposal is that 
requiring courts to consider the intent of traffickers would allow them 
an unwarranted “safe harbor” when the circumvention technology 
they distribute gets used for copyright infringing purposes.  Certainly 
there is some logic to this argument because it seems reasonable for 
someone who provides others with the technology to break the law to 
be held accountable for his actions.  However, the other side of the 
policy argument is that it is unfair to hold a well-intentioned 
manufacturer liable for the nefarious acts of the consumer.  Rather 
than reinvent the wheel to find the best balance between these two, 
the proposal simply borrows the well-developed concept of 
contributory copyright infringement. 
Contributory copyright infringement provides, inter alia, that one 
who distributes equipment that facilitates copyright infringement may 
be held liable if he: (1) knows or has reason to know of the direct 
infringement,176 and (2) materially contributes to the infringement.177  
Recently courts have modified the second requirement, and courts 
now require “inducement,” or intent to facilitate infringement, before 
they will impose liability.178  Largely, courts look to how the 
defendant promoted his or her product to make an inference of its 
intended uses.179 
Like contributory infringement, the proposal examines the 
defendant’s intent by adopting a standard similar to “inducement.”  
However, to reflect the fact that the ACPs were designed to give 
copyright holders additional abilities to prosecute infringers, it 
 
176 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). 
177 Id. at 1022. 
178 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005). 
179 Id. at 940. 
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employs a standard of intent more favorable to copyright owners.  
Recall that the proposal provides for an affirmative defense, meaning 
the defendant must prove intent to facilitate solely fair use.  In 
contrast, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the intent associated 
with inducement in a contributory infringement claim.  Under the 
proposal, the plaintiff has the much easier task of showing only that 
the defendant has failed to meet his burden. 
A final argument is that the proposal is entirely unnecessary 
because the ACPs already provide a remedy for fair-use conflicts: the 
triennial Librarian of Congress exemption process outlined in Part III, 
supra.  Proponents of this argument would claim that, to seek redress 
when one’s fair-use rights are infringed upon, an individual need 
merely petition the Librarian of Congress, who would grant an 
exemption.  This argument fails because the exemption process is 
wholly inadequate for several reasons.  First, an exemption granted 
only applies to the § 1201(a)(1) ban on individual acts of 
circumvention, not the trafficking bans, which, as demonstrated, also 
substantially interfere with fair use.180  Additionally, the Librarian of 
Congress only grants a handful of exemptions once every three years, 
so the process is too slow to accommodate all those whose fair-use 
rights are affected by the ACPs.  Finally, obtaining an exemption is 
no easy feat; even when the request is for a bona fide, fair-use 
purpose, the Librarian of Congress frequently turns them down.  For 
example, in the most recent rulemaking, the Librarian of Congress 
expressly denied a request for an exemption to allow circumvention 
of CSS on DVDs in order to create backup copies, media shift, and 
view them on incompatible players.181  Ultimately, Congress may 
have intended the rulemaking process to assuage interference with 
fair use, but it is simply inadequate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Undeniably, the digital age has presented copyright owners with a 
new challenge.  Digital works can be both copied and shared with 
ease and in perfect quality.  Congress’ response to this challenge was 
the DMCA and its accompanying ACPs, which added an additional 
layer of protection to digital works.  While effective at deterring 
 
180 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(E) (2006). 
181 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,478–79 (Nov. 27, 2006) (codified 
at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40). 
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infringement, the ACPs as enforced violate congressional intent by 
severely restricting fair use. 
Certainly, this problem could be solved by repealing the ACPs, but 
doing so would likely overcorrect the problem, leaving copyright 
owners with inadequate means to protect their digital works from 
infringement.  Instead, a better solution is the proposal outlined in this 
Comment, which advocates linking circumvention with infringement 
by allowing fair use as an affirmative defense to violations of §§ 
1201(a)–(b).  Ultimately, this standard would lead to rulings that both 
preserve fair use and prevent digital copyright infringement.  A 
central theme to copyright law is achieving the balance between 
protecting works to encourage creativity and ensuring that the public 
gets the benefit of that innovation.  Fair use is a long-standing 
doctrine and a critical component of this balance.  It should not be lost 
in the digital age. 
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